Europe’s Evolving NatGas Problems
What I’m Watching…
With recent events there has been an, what I would call, ‘irresponsible,’ focus on the Baltic Sea with the (likely) clandestine activities centered around Nord Stream 1 & 2 pipelines.
The intelligent thing would be to look elsewhere to see what pipelines will be hard-pressed to try and pick up the slack, but in order to narrow this down a bit, I figured I’d focus on the marine lines — as these lines are at greater risk for further acts of violent tomfoolery. In our current era the advent of modern aviation, including but not limited to UAVs and consistent patrol capacity with visibility up to great distances, and the inclusion of low Earth orbit surveillance satellites, bodies of water provide a particular veil of protection for acts of subterfuge. Not just for line of sight, but for sound suppression, and the additional potential to mask (or obfuscate) thermal profiles.
According to the U.S. Energy Information Association (EIA), the EU consumes roughly 45 billion cubic feed per day (bcfd) of natural gas (including liquified natgas), with more than 80% of this consumption being imported. This means that about 36 bcfd is brought to the EU via imports from Russia, Norway, Northern Africa, and Azerbaijan. With Russia taking the lion’s share of those imports, the next sources of interest would be Azerbaijan and Northern Africa for risks of tomfoolery.
Algeria
Algeria has found themselves in a position of now significant potential power. In 2021 Algeria provided the EU with 34 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natgas, representing 8% of the Union’s natgas imports. That single digit percentage can sound minuscule, but when Russia supplies 4x what Algeria does, and Russia continues to be aggressively sanctioned by the EU, UK and US… what little bit Algeria can supply becomes far more important.
Turkey
The TANAP/TAP, pipeline that stretches the length of Turkey and is sourced in Azerbaijan, has already seen a reported attempt of sabotage on October 13, 2022. If this proves to be a legitimate thwarting of subterfuge, I would personally be looking to the pipelines that spider across Algeria and feed into both Spain and Italy. The PIIGS (Portugal, Italy, Ireland, Greece, Spain) are also sporting some of the worst numbers as far as economic health goes. Spain is rocking a 120% debt to GDP ratio with Italy surpassing at 155% debt:GDP; these countries represent points of significant fragility — in my oh so humble opinion. Not in the sense of lacking capability to defend or maintain these lifelines, but more so in the sense of if these pipelines were to be sabotaged like the NordStream pipelines… the PIIGS would likely be among the first to become casualties. Not unlike how in recessionary contractions, those citizens (and businesses) that have already maxed-out their debt exposure find themselves pressed into an economic corner.
There is also the TurkStream project, encompassing 2 pipelines stretching across the center of the Black Sea; one completed and one in progress. With total projected capacity being over 30 bcmy, and having delivered 16.8 bcm in 2021.
Quick Thoughts
I’m no tactical or military genius, but considering TANAP’s perceived thwarted attack (reportedly on Russian soil); it would appear that whomever the would-be aggressors are picking portions of pipeline that are distanced from NATO forces. Allowing for disconnect from eyes on heightened alert, and increasing likelihood of getting away with their missions. I would expect a similar tact to be taken if targets were to be placed on the lines sprawling across Algeria.
Another point that could/would weaken Europe’s prospects would be attempts to spoil conversations around the completion & revival of the Trans-Saharan Gas Pipeline (TSGP). The TGSP would sprawl the African continent; crossing from the coasts of Nigeria, through Niger, and to the Algerian junction, and would provide 30bcm per year.
There is yet another point that I believe should also be known, or understood, of which I was very ignorant-to prior to the Nord Stream events; sea mines. Below is an image that I made where I took the top image (produced by the Baltic Ordinance Safety Board) from this article; detailing locations of sea mine deployments from decades of war, particularly the world wars. The color scheme represents low-to-medium risk (yellow) and high risk (red).
At which point I grabbed a screenshot from ENTSOG’s 2021 pipeline transmission report and added the nice little red circles to highly areas that I believe are of high interest. And should be kept in-mind when we receive headlines of damages done to such undersea pipelines.
